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INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1960's as many as eleven unauthorized broadcasting stations were
operating from ships or fixed platforms in the coastal waters off Northern Europe
and Great Britain.' These sea-based broadcasting stations, dubbed "pirate"
broadcasters by the popular press, first appeared in 1958,2 flourished for a few
years, but then vanished from the airways. The last station, Radio Caroline, man-
aged to remain on the air from time to time until it sank in a storm in 1979. 3 That
even one such station was in existence until only a few years ago, despite signifi-
cant individual and concerted efforts by the European states to close them down,
indicates that pirate radio stations filled a need not met by local broadcasting
facilities,4 and served a constituency of sufficient strength to make effective action
against them difficult. 5 As the "pirate radio ship of the 1980's"-a space satellite
capable of direct radio and TV broadcasts to ground receivers- becomes a reality,
it is appropriate to examine the rise of the pirate stations, the reasons they flour-
ished, the problems encountered in suppressing them, and the jurisdictional theo-
ries of international law relied upon in eventually bringing them under control.
II
THE ORIGIN OF PIRATE RADIO BROADCASTING
Pirate radio stations flourished in the late 1950's and early to mid-1960's
because they filled a need that was not being met by existing broadcasting facili-
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ties. Then, as now, broadcasting in most European countries was a. state
monopoly. 6 It was, as well, almost exclusively noncommercial, usually supported
by the license or subscription fees of listeners and viewers. 7 Programming was
generally quite limited, traditional, and slow to adjust to the changing musical
tastes of the listening audience, particularly to the young's craze for "pop" or rock
music of the era.8 In Britain, the target of the largest number of pirate stations,
BBC's so-called Light Programme made little effort to cater to the rise in popu-
larity of the American-style, disc-jockey-oriented, continuous popular
programming. 9
That a market existed for rock programming was demonstrated by the success
of several broadcasting stations operating from the few states that did permit com-
mercial broadcasting.' 0 Radio Luxembourg, Radio Andorra, and Radio-TV
Monte Carlo, each with powerful transmitters aimed not only at local audiences
but also at the populations of nearby countries, were notable examples." There
was,' then, clearly a market for additional commercial stations providing contin-
uous music programming. But the territories and frequencies available for such
land-based broadcasting were strictly limited by national regulations.' 2  As a
result, entrepreneurs desiring to tap this market were forced to establish their facil-
ities outside the jurisdiction of any state. The high seas provided the obvious loca-
tion. Thus, the birth of the pirate radio station-a station located either on a
floating platform (ship or barge) anchored or steaming outside the territorial
waters of any state' 3 or on a fixed platform built in shallow waters outside the
territorial sea.' 4
To understand why broadcasting entrepreneurs were forced out to sea, the
national and international regulatory framework for radio broadcasting must be
examined.
III
THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS FOR REGULATING
RADIO BROADCASTING
Soon after the invention of radio, most states recognized the need for regula-
tion of radio transmissions to prevent interference between users, and enacted
national legislation to allocate frequencies and regulate transmissions of radio sig-
6. Se Hunnings, supra note 3, at 415-46. See generaly B. PAULU, supra note 1, at 58-89.
7. B. PAULU, supra note 1, at 90-94.
8. See D. SMITH, supra note 4, at 96-98.
9. P. HARRIS, WHEN PIRATES RULED THE WAVES 32 (4th ed. 1970).
10. Id. at 52-53.
11. See Hunnings, supra note 2, at 416.
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
13. A variety of craft, including a ferry boat, a Liberty ship, a mine sweeper, lightships, and coasters,
were converted into seagoing broadcasting stations. See P. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 207-16.
14. Several abandoned World War II antiaircraft forts (Martello towers) located off the coast of Great
Britain were used as broadcasting platforms. Hunnings, supra note 2, at 412; P.HARRIS, supra note 9, at
207-16. An artificial structure was built off the coast of the Netherlands for use specifically as a broad-
casting platform. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, Legal Aspects of Arate Broadcasting. A Dutch Approach, 60
AM. J. INT'L L. 303, 303-04 (1966).
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nals. Since, however, radio signals, unlike wire transmissions, had no fixed ter-
minal points and crossed international borders indiscriminately, it became
apparent quite early that international as well as national regulatory measures
were needed. 15
The current international regulatory body, the International Telecommunica-
tion Union, a specialized agency of the United Nations with headquarters in
Geneva, originated in 1865 as the International Telegraph Union, which was itself
established, as its name suggests, to regulate telegraph communications. 16 With
the advent of radio, the International Telegraph Union assumed jurisdiction of
that field, holding its first International Radio Conference in 1906.17 Since that
time, it has held periodic international conferences and adopted a number of inter-
national conventions allocating the radio spectrum among different uses and by
geographical regions.' At the 1932 conference in Madrid, the name of the organi-
zation was changed to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to
reflect its broader sphere of interest.19 The currently effective International Tele-
communication Convention (which is the international convention from which the
ITU derives its authority) was negotiated in Malaga-Torremolinos in 1973 and
entered into force in 1976.20 The actual allocation of frequencies and detailed
regulation of radio emissions are undertaken in periodic general and specialized
administrative conferences, and the resulting regulations are annexed to the effec-
tive telecommunication convention.2 1
The conventions establishing the ITU and the regulations implementing and
governing its operations do not, however, give it any enforcement power. These
powers reside in individual state parties.22 Further, allocations of specific frequen-
cies are not made directly to states by the ITU or its operating bodies, but rather
are left to regional cooperation. 23 In Europe, for example, country-by-country
assignments were undertaken in a series of plans (such as the Geneva and Lucerne
15. D. SMITH, supra note 4, at 18.
16. M. FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICA-
TION UNION AND PRE-ITU CONFERENCES 4 (1975);B. PAULU, supra note 1, at 9.
17. B. PAULU, supra note 1, at 11.
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 11.
20. International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 8572
(entered into force with respect to the United States Apr. 7, 1976).
21. Radio Regulations, Dec. 21, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 2377, T.I.A.S. No. 4893; Partial Revision of Radio
Regulations, Nov. 8, 1963, Additional Protocol, 15 U.S.T. 887, T.I.A.S. No. 5603 (radio bands for space
radiocommunications purposes); Partial Revision of Radio Regulations, Apr. 29, 1966, Additional Pro-
tocol, 18 U.S.T. 2091, T.I.A.S. No. 6332 (aeronautical mobile service); Partial Revision of Radio Regula-
tions, Nov. 3, 1967, Final Protocol: Maritime Mobile Service, 19 U.S.T. 6717, T.I.A.S. No. 6590 (maritime
mobile service); Partial Revision of Radio Regulations, July 17, 1971, Final Protocol: Space Telecommu-
nications, 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No. 7435 (space telecommunications); Partial Revision of Radio Regu-
lations, June 8, 1974, Final Protocol: Maritime Radio, 28 U.S.T. 3909, T.I.A.S. 8599 (radio-telephone
coast stations); Partial Revision of Radio Regulations, Mar. 5, 1978, Final Protocol: Aeronautical Mobile
(R) Service, T.I.A.S. 9920 (aeronautical mobile service). For a comprehensive discussion of the ITU regu-
latory scheme and the most recent World Administrative Radio Conference (1979), see Robinson, Regu-
lating International Airwaves.. The 1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-12 (1980).
22. See, e.g., International Telecommunication Convention, supra note 20, preamble, arts. 24, 35
§§ 2-3, 37, 44, 50.
23. Id. art. 7 § 3(2); Radio Regulations, Dec. 21, 1959, supra note 21, art. 5.
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plans), the latest of which are the Copenhagen Plan of 1948 for AM radio broad-
cast frequencies and the Stockholm Plans of 1952 and 1961 for television and
FM. 24 At the time pirate radio stations began appearing off the coast of Europe,
several European states were not yet parties to the Copenhagen Convention of
1948.25 Even some of those that were parties failed to live up to their enforcement
obligations. 26  Thus, the existing international plan for the allocation of broad-
casting frequencies in Europe was not fully effective. For example, the European
Broadcasting Union reported that on May 1, 1967, 9 of 26 longwave and 315 of
521 mediumwave stations were operating outside the Copenhagen Plan. 27
Nevertheless, despite this widespread nonobservance of its regulations for the
operation of broadcasting stations within national territories, the ITU adopted a
rule in 1959 which was directed to the suppression of radio broadcasting occurring
outside the national territory of any state. It provided: "The establishment and
use of broadcasting stations (sound broadcasting and television broadcasting sta-
tions) on board ships, aircraft or any other floating or airborne objects outside
national territories is prohibited. ' 28 Of course, since the ITU itself had no enforce-
ment authority, enforcement was left to individual states. 29 The convention did
not suggest how states were to accomplish this, but the conference urged states to
study the means to do S0.30 A review of the possible means open to states to extend
the jursidictional reach of their national enforcement authority, the theoretical
bases for those means, and how the various means worked in practice makes up the
bulk of the remainder of this paper. Before proceeding to those issues, however,
the paper explores the reasons that states were concerned about stamping out
pirate broadcasting.
24. B. PAULU, supra note 1, at 13-14.
25. Id. at 14 n.t.
26. Id. at 14-15.
27. Id. at 15, n.t.
28. Radio Regulations, Dec. 21, 1959, supra note 21, art. 7 § 1 (reg. 422). The Radio Regulations of
the International Telecommunication Convention have contained restrictions directed at unauthorized
broadcasts from the high seas since the 1938 Cairo Conference. D. SMITH, supra note 4, at 73-74; General
Radio Regulations (Cairo Revision) Apr. 8, 1938, art. 21(A) § 1(2), 54 Stat. 1417, 1523 (reg. 473), T.S. No.
948. The language of the original provision was modified in 1947, Radio Regulations annexed to the
International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 2, 1947, art. 28 § 5 (reg. 579), 63 Stat. 1581, 1819,
T.I.A.S. No. 1901, and again in 1959. It is now found in art. 28 § 6 (reg. 962) of the Radio Regulations:
"The operation of a broadcasting service .. .by mobile stations at sea and over the sea is prohibited."
Dec. 21, 1959, supra note 21. Broadcasting service is defined in the regulations as "[a] radiocommunication
service in which transmissions are intended for direct reception by the general public. . . . [and which]
may include sound transmissions, television transmissions or other types of transmissions." Id. art. I (reg.
28).
Concern over the application of regulation 962 to nonmobile, permanently moored vessels or to
"floating islands" encouraged the 1959 conference to adopt a specific regulation aimed directly at pirate
radio broadcasts. D. SMITH, supra note 4, at 74. The wording of this regulation (see text accompanying this
note) refers only to floating and airborne objects and thus excludes stations resting on the seabed. Hun-
nings, supra note 2, at 415.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
30. Van Panhuys & van Eride Boas, supra note 14, at 307.
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IV
PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY PIRATE BROADCASTING
The basic problem presented by pirate radio stations was that they struck at
the very heart of the comprehensive and sophisticated national and international
regulatory schemes adopted by the international community to ensure order and
noninterference between uses and users of the radio spectrum. Since the spectrum
of radio frequencies allocated to radio broadcasting is limited 3' and a large
number of broadcasting stations were competing for places on the spectrum, the
intrusion of broadcasting stations free to pick their own frequencies and radiated-
power levels was bound to create interference with other stations. Further, use of
frequencies allocated to other purposes for broadcasting interfered with those other
authorized uses. Although pirate radio stations attempted to select frequencies
that would not interfere with others (out of self-interest in a clear channel as well
as consideration for other stations), both of those types of interference were alleged
to have occurred in Europe.3 2 Powerful British pirate stations were reported to
have caused interference with broadcasting in Sweden, Belgium, Poland, Yugo-
slavia, Italy and Czechoslovakia. 33 There were also reports of interference with
maritime and aircraft communications. 34
The large number of land-based stations operating in Europe during this
period on unauthorized frequencies and at excessive power 35 suggests, however,
that the real problem European states found with sea-based pirate stations was not
frequency interference but rather the threat posed to state radio monopolies. 36 In
1966, a survey commissioned by one of the pirates, Radio Caroline, indicated that
both Radio Caroline and Radio London, the two most successful of the pirates,
had an audience of over 8,000,000 listeners. 37 Although the BBC claimed that the
audience of all the pirates combined was only about one-quarter of the audience of
its Light Programme and less than one-half of the Home Service program audi-
ence,38 the audience share of the pirates was impressive when it is recalled that
they were only a few new stations pitted against the total array of BBC stations, all
of which had been in operation for decades. This certainly says something about
the popularity of the programming of the BBC in that era. 39
Another of the problems presented by the pirates concerned copyright and per-
forming rights. It was claimed that the pirates were successful at least in part
because they were, in effect, getting a free ride since they paid no royalty, copy-
right, or performing-rights fees.40 The BBC, on the other hand, had to purchase
31. In Europe, the AM radio spectrum is 150-285 Kcs. and 525-1605 Kcs. B. PAULU, supra note 1, at
12.
32. P. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 149.
33. Id.
34. B. PAULU, supra note 1, at 22.
35. Smith, Pirate Broadcasting, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 810 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Pirate
Broadcasting 1.
36. See, e.g., P. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 52-53; B. PAULU, supra note 1, at 22.
37. P. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 52-53; B. PAULU, supra note 1, at 21.
38. B. PAULU, supra note 1, at 21.
39. See P. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 32 (quoting the Sunday Express). The BBC has since altered some
of its programming. Pirate Broadcasting, supra note 35, at 814.
40. Pirate Broadcasting, supra note 35, at 773.
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the right to play a record from the recording company and then negotiate a sepa-
rate agreement with the performing-rights holders in order to broadcast recorded
music, the principal fare of the pirates. Moreover, the performing-rights agree-
ments contained restrictions that did not encumber the pirates. These were the so-
called needle time provisions, designed to limit the number of hours per week that
the authorized stations could use recorded music. 4 1 Such agreements were thought
to be to the advantage of both the record manufacturers and performing artists
who believed that if recorded music were used without limit, less time would be
devoted to live music and fewer records would be sold.4 2
The pirate stations disputed both of these latter contentions. All of the leading
British pirates claimed to have paid a percentage of their revenue to the per-
forming-rights societies, 43 and they also claimed that all of the offshore stations
were "continuously assailed by record companies, promoters and musicians with
requests to broadcast their work. Free and unsolicited records arrive[d] by almost
every post."' 4 4 The two Dutch pirate stations complied with all Netherlands copy-
right and performing-rights laws.4 5 In addition, the pirates claimed that by broad-
casting records from little known artists or recording companies, they played a
substantial part in breaking the record monopoly in Great Britain where, in the
early 1960's ninety-eight percent of all records sold bore the label of only four
manufacturers. 46 According to one claim, with the help of the pirates small record
companies were able to get twenty percent of the market in three years.4 7
Finally, the pirate stations presented what might be called a sociological
problem. Continuous rock music was considered by the British power structure as
somehow morally decadent despite its substantial popularity. 48 It epitomized the
social turmoil of the 1960's, an era marked by long hair, eccentric clothes and free
life style.
Although the pirates probably could have been put out of business in a few
weeks if the conventional stations had adopted their programming, this solution
was never adopted. Instead, all nations affected by the outbreak of radio piracy
chose to seek other means of suppression, even reaching the point of government
jamming of the transmissions of a particularly persistent pirate in 1970. 4 9
V
THE LEGAL STATUS OF PIRATE RADIO STATIONS
In a legal sense the term pirate connotes one who is an international outlaw,
one whose conduct'is so violent, lawless, reprehensible or threatening to the lawful
activities of others on the high seas that he is universally condemned. He cannot
41. Id at 773 n.8.
42. Id.
43. P. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 49.
44. Id.
45. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 14, at 311 n.38.
46. P. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 198-99.
47. Id.
48. Pirate Broadcastbig, supra note 35, at 772.
49. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1970, § 1, at 32, col. 4.
[Vol. 45: No. I
PIRATE RADIO BROADCASTING
claim the protection of any state, and he is subject to universal jurisdiction. Any
state can seize, try, and punish him whether he is found on the high seas or in any
other place outside the jurisdiction of a state. This is the traditional status of
pirates under both customary international law and the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas.50 In the 19th century, some states attempted to equate engaging in the
slave trade to piracy, thereby authorizing universal jurisdiction over slave traders.
This effort failed, and Great Britain, the leading proponent of this position, even-
tually conceded that it could act against slave trading nationals of other states only
by virtue of a treaty. 51 More recently, the nearly universal condemnation of air-
craft hijacking and the widespread adherence to the antihijacking conventions
have created nearly universal jurisdiction over aircraft hijackers.5 2
Despite their colorful appellation, no state has seriously suggested that radio
pirates be equated to pirates in the legal sense.53 While their activity is unlawful-
at least among states that are adherents to the Radio Regulations annexed to the
1973 Malaga-Torremolinos Convention 54 and perhaps under a narrow interpreta-
tion of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas-5 5 -it is not of the violent and
flagrant character which calls for the universal jurisdiction described above.56
States seeking to suppress radio pirates have turned to more conservative theories
of jurisdiction on which to base their actions.
If radio pirates are not pirates in the legal sense, what is their status? Any
analysis of the legal status of pirate stations operating on the high seas must pro-
ceed from two points: the nature and location of the platform (the station) from
which the broadcast originates, and the nature of the activity involved (radio
broadcasting).
All pirate radio stations that have existed to the present time have been located
either on a ship anchored or steaming on the high seas or on an installation fixed
to the seabed in shallow water outside the coastal state's territorial sea. 57 The legal
characteristics of each of these platforms will be examined below.
One of the prized freedoms of the seas which the traditional maritime states,
including the Northern European states affected by pirate radio broadcasting,
have assiduously sought to protect is the right of all states to sail ships on the high
seas under their own flags. This right embraces a number of concepts. The essen-
tial ones, insofar as this analysis is concerned, are that a ship has the nationality of
50. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 14-22, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as High Seas Convention].
51. Hunnings, supra note 2, at 426. See also M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF
THE OCEANS 767, 881-85 (1962).
52. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
53. But see infra notes 186-213 and accompanying text (discussion of article 109 of the Draft Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea).
54. See supra note 21.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 71-75.
56. Pirate broadcasting activities are not piracy in the technical sense because they involve no "illegal
acts of violence, detention or. . .depradation ...[o]n the high seas." High Seas Convention, supra note
50, art. 15.
57. See supra note 14; Hunnings, supra note 2, at 410-12.
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its flag (registration), 58 that each state has the right to determine the conditions for
the grant of its nationality (flag),59 and that a ship on the high seas is immune
from arrest or detention by the authorities of any state other than the state of its
registration. 60 This last concept means that so long as a ship is on the high seas,
even if engaged in an illegal activity other than piracy, only the flag state has
enforcement jurisdiction over the ship. Thus, if the flag state is unwilling or
unable to take enforcement measures against the ship, no other state can lawfully
do so. If, however, a pirate radio ship should stray into the territorial sea of a
coastal state, it is fully subject to the laws of the coastal state. There is no principle
of international law which prevents a coastal state from exercising its enforcement
jurisdiction against the foreign-flag ship for any violations of the coastal state's
laws which may have been committed while the ship was within the territorial
sea. 6 1 The ship's immunity applies only on the high seas.
The status of platforms fixed to the seabed beyond the territorial sea is not
quite so clear.62 Until the adoption of the Continental Shelf Convention in 1958,
no customary international law of fixed platforms paralleling the customary law as
to the legal status of ships had developed.6 3 That convention gives each coastal
state the exclusive right "to construct and maintain or operate on the continental
shelf installations and other devices necessary for its exploration and the exploita-
tion of its natural resources." '64 Further, the convention provides that such instal-
lations are "under the jurisdiction of the coastal state."'65 Thus, insofar as the
explicit provisions of the convention are involved, there is no authority either for
or against the exercise of coastal state jurisdiction over installations affixed to the
shelf unless those installations were constructed or are used for exploration or
exploitation of the shelf resources. It certainly could be argued that the conven-
tion itself does not prohibit any state from constructing a platform on the conti-
nental shelf of another state so long as that platform is not intended or used for
resource exploration or exploitation, and as long as it does not interfere with either
the coastal state's own exploration or exploitation or its research undertaken there.
The jurisdictional status of such a structure would, however, be cloudy. An argu-
ment could be made that because of the legal vacuum, the state authorizing con-
struction should have jurisdiction, 66 but an equally valid argument could be made
on behalf of coastal-state jurisdiction based on contiguity.67
58. High Seas Convention, supra note 50, art. 5.
59. Id.
60. Id. arts. 6, 11, 22.
61. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea Convention].
62! See generaly N. PAPADAKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME OF ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS 89-103
(1977).
63. Id. at 90.
64. Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 5 § 2, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention].
65. Id. art. 5 § 4.
66. See N. PAPADAKIS, supra note 62, at 129-30; Pirate Broadcasirng, supra note 35, at 780-82; van
Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 14, at 320-22, 332-33.
67. See N. PAPADAKIS, supra note 62, at 130-31; Pfrate Broadcastng, supra note 35, at 779-80; van
Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 14, at 321-22, 334-35.
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Fortunately, the pirate stations that were built on fixed installations did not
pose questions quite that complicated because only one state was involved. Those
off the English coast were built on abandoned World War II antiaircraft towers
constructed by the British Government 68 and the single station on a built-to-order
tower was Radio and TV Noordzee, which was erected by a private Dutch com-
pany just beyond the outer limits of the Netherlands territorial sea. 6 9 In neither
case, therefore, would the coastal state seeking to extend its jurisdiction and
enforcement power to the towers face the prospect of another state purporting to
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the tower, its occupants and activities.
Nevertheless, as nations which had accepted international law as part of domestic
law,70 both Great Britain and the Netherlands faced the issue of whether the reach
of their domestic jurisdiction extended to towers fixed to the seabed of the conti-
nental shelf beyond their territorial seas. As shall be seen below, neither chose to
base their jurisdictional claims on the continental shelf doctrine.
With regard to the activity involved, radio broadcasting, it must be determined
whether this activity can be characterized as a freedom of the high seas.
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, which is "generally declara-
tory of established principles of international law,"'7 1 states that the high seas are
open to all states. It further provides a specific enumeration of four freedoms-
navigation, fishing, laying of pipelines and cables and flight-which, along with
others "recognized by the general principles of international law," may be exer-
cised by ll states "with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their
exercise of the freedom of the high seas."' 72 The list does not explicitly include or
exclude the freedom to broadcast from the high seas, but this omission of explicit
reference is not dispositive of the question. Although some have argued that the
freedoms of the high seas are limited to the four listed and activities similar to
them,7 3 a broader interpretation, one embracing any peaceful activity not
expressly prohibited by international law, is more consistent with the language of
the article. Such an interpretation is also more logical and has received the sup-
port of eminent legal authorities.7 4 Adopting this broad interpretation, broad-
casting from the high seas would presumptively be a freedom of the seas unless it
came into conflict with some other prohibition of international law, or interfered
with another state in its exercise of a freedom of the high seas. 75
68. Hunnings, supra note 2, at 412.
69. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 14, at 303.
70. See West Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B. 391; The Nyugat (Swiss Corpo-
ration Societe Anonyme Maritime et Commercial v. Netherlands), 10 NEDERLANDSE TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
INTERNATIONAL RECHT 82 (1963)(Hoge Road der Nederlanden, 1959).
71. High Seas Convention, supra note 50, preamble.
72. Id. art. 2.
73. C.J. Colombos quoted !n N. PAPADAKIS, supra note 62, at 59; Pirate Broadcasting, supra note 35, at
776-78; Tammes, Freedom of the High Seas. Legitimacy of;a "television island, " 86B E.B.U. RFv. GENERAL AND
LEGAL 38 (1964).
74. McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 51, at 762-63; M. MOUTON, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 228
(1952); Sir Humphrey Waldcock, quoted i N. PAPADAKIS, supra note 62, at 58; Pirate Broadcasting, supra note
35, at 776-78.
75. Presumably, broadcasting from the high seas might disturb the internal social order of the affected
state. See supra note 48. It would not, however, interfere with that state's freedom of the seas. Without
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Before discussing whether broadcasting in fact conflicts with some other prohi-
bition or interferes with another state's exercise of a freedom, one must examine
whether the freedoms of the high seas adhere to individuals or only to states. The
language of the High Seas Convention would suggest that the latter is correct.
Article 2 states that the high seas are "open to all nations,' 76 and that the freedom
of the high seas "comprises, inter a/'a, both for coastal and noncoastal States" the
listed freedoms. 77 It further provides that "all States" shall exercise these rights
"with reasonable regard to the interests of other States.",, Article 4 provides that
States shall have the right to sail ships. 79 Other articles are cast in similar terms.8 0
The implication of this for entities that are not states conducting activities on
the high seas is that any right they have is derivative of a state right. This is
manifested in the case of ships by the requirement that a ship, to be entitled to sail
the high seas, must be registered in some state in accordance with the law of that
state.8 ' As a first-order requirement for legality, then, a ship carrying out broad-
casting activities from the high seas would have to be registered in some state. A
stateless ship being used for radio broadcasting from the high seas would be enti-
tled to no protection whatever, 2 and as a practical matter, would have no
"parent" state to which it could turn for diplomatic protection if the authorities of
a coastal state took action against it. But no owner of a pirate broadcasting ship
would have been so foolish as to operate without registering the ship in some state,
and, with the limited exceptions contained in article 22 of the High Seas Conven-
tion,83 only the state of registration would have competence to stop, board or
arrest it on the high seas.8
4
In the case of fixed platforms, the law is less clear. As has been seen, with the
exception of structures built on the continental shelf for resource exploration or
exploitation, neither the Continental Shelf Convention nor customary interna-
tional law addresses the relationship between a structure built on the continental
shelf and the state whose nationals are carrying out activities on the structure.
8 5
such a showing, such broadcasting would not be a violation of the High Seas Convention. See Pirate Broad-
casting, supra note 35, at 779.
76. High Seas Convention, supra note 50, art. 2 (emphasis added).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., id. art. 26, granting to states the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines.
81. See I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 595 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955); High Seas Con-
vention, supra note 50, arts. 5 § 1, 6 § 2.
82. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 81, at 595. See also Fkrate Broadcastihg, supra note 35, at 789.
83. Article 22 § 1 provides that, except in the execution of powers derived from a treaty, a warship
may not stop and board a foreign-flag merchant ship on the high seas unless there is reasonable ground for
suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy or the slave trade or is "in reality, of the same nationality as
the warship," though "flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag." High Seas Convention, supra note
50, art. 22 § 1.
84. High Seas Convention, supra note 50, art. 6 § 1. Traditionally, also, a nation's attribution of
nationality to a ship entitled to fly its flag has been deemed conclusive. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, supra note
81, at 595; M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 51, at 1012, 1057-61. The ambiguous "genuine link"
requirement of article 5 presents a possibility of mischievous subversion of this principle of exclusive com-
petence. See id. at 1013-57. However, the author is not aware of any incidents suggesting that states have
departed from the traditional view since the convention entered into force.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
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The absence of such a legal relationship, analogous to that which exists between a
ship and the state of registry, means that there is no state from which the nonstate
entity can derive rights. It is hard, therefore, to find a basis on which someone
carrying out a non-resource-related activity on a fixed platform could meet this
first-order requirement for legality of his action as the exercise of a freedom of the
high seas. A legal vacuum would exist with no clear guidelines to determine what
state or states would be entitled to fill it. An analogy to stateless ships would not
be appropriate, since there is no doctrine for structures affixed to the seabed corre-
sponding to the doctrine of nationality for ships.
8 6
Assuming for the purpose of further analysis, however, that the person or entity
broadcasting from the high seas does meet the first-order requirement of having a
derivative right to exercise a freedom of the high seas, the questions previously
postponed-whether broadcasting from the high seas conflicts with some prohibi-
tion of international law or interferes with another state in its exercise of a freedom
of the high seas-can now be addressed.
As briefly mentioned earlier, in 1959 the ITU adopted an administrative regu-
lation (regulation 422) specifically aimed at pirate stations.8 7 It provided: "The
establishment and use of broadcasting stations (sound broadcasting and television
broadcasting stations) on board ships, aircraft or any other floating or airborne
objects outside national territories is prohibited."8 8 This provision supplemented
an earlier rule, first adopted in 1938, which in its current revision provides that
"Itihe operation of a broadcasting service by mobile stations at sea and over the
sea is prohibited."a 9 The apparent objective of the earlier rule was to protect
essential radio communications at sea (ship-ship, ship-shore, aircraft-shore, etc.).
Also it was narrowly drawn, applying only to mobile stations. 9° Its applicability to
anchored ships, even ifcapable of movement, was questionable. 9 1 Regulation 422,
adopted in 1959 at the instigation of the Scandinavian states, was, however, aimed
directly at pirate radio stations and was intended to remove the loophole as to
nonmobile stations.92 Unfortunately even this regulation contained its own loop-
hole. Since it applied only to stations on ships, aircraft or anyfioating or airborne
object,93 it had no applicability to stations on platforms fixed to the seabed-a
rather short-sighted omission.
A second ITU radio regulation, though not aimed only at broadcasting stations,
86. See N. PAPADAKIS, supra note 62, at 124-27. Papadakis suggests, however, that jurisdiction based
on nationality of the owners of an installation would be sufficient to support jurisdiction over the installa-
tion. Id. at 127-29. See also infra text accompanying notes 140-50 for discussion of nationality as a basis
for jurisdiction.
87. See supra text accompanying note 28.
88. Id.
89. See supra note 28. The text of the 1938 regulation 473 is: "Mobile stations at sea shall be prohib-
ited from making radiotelephone broadcast transmissions intended to be received by the general public."
The text of the 1947 revision (regulation 579) is: "Broadcasting by mobile stations at sea and over the sea is
prohibited."
90. Praie Broadcasting, supra note 35, at 798-99 n.83.
91. Id.
92. Hunnings, supra note 2, at 414.
93. Radio Regulations, Dec. 21, 1959, supra note 21, art. 7 § I (reg. 422).
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appears to be applicable to them. Regulation 72594 provides: "No transmitting
station may be established or operated by a private person or by any enterprise
without a license issued by the government of the country to which the station in
question is subject." 95 This regulation is of general applicability, applying to land-
based as well as extraterritorial stations. There are, as well, additional provisions
applicable to ship-borne stations, 96 including one allowing the authorities of ports-
of-call to inspect ships to determine whether the ships have a license and if mani-
fest irregularities exist. 97 The enforcement actions of these port-state authorities,
however, are limited to the reporting of any irregularities to the flag state. 98
Thus, as between states parties to the ITU regulations, the operation of a ship-
based broadcasting station by ships registered in the territory of one of the states
parties is contrary to international law.
Since, however, not all states are parties to the convention and regulations,
these regulations are not universally binding unless it can be found that they are
somehow declarative of customary international law or have ripened into a general
norm.99 The convention and regulations are technical in nature and are, for the
most part, concerned with allocating the radio spectrum among competing claim-
ants and uses, so an argument that the provisions have become customary norms
would be tenuous indeed. No state seeking to act against pirate radio stations has
bottomed its actions on such a theory.
The argument that broadcasting from the high seas is not a freedom of the seas
because it interferes with the interests of other states in their exercise of a freedom
of the high seas also seems tenuous. ° ° Although there may have been some iso-
lated instances of pirate radio station interference with marine or air communica-
tions, the chance of this having been a serious problem was remote. After all, for
pirate radio broadcasting to have been commercially successful, it had to reach a
mass audience. To reach such an audience the pirate had to use the spectrum
allocated to broadcasting because that was the band that listeners' sets were manu-
factured to receive. The audience for a private station broadcasting on a fre-
quency lawfully allocated to some other use would have been nil. Although a
badly tuned, malfunctioning, or poorly manufactured broadcasting transmitter
might emit spurious signals that could interfere with other uses, such emissions
would not render broadcasting as an ac/wioy an unreasonable interference with the
other lawful activity. The broadcaster would, of course, have to clean up his
signal, but if that were done the interference with other high seas uses would pre-
sumably disappear.
Broadcasting from the high seas, then, can arguably be characterized as a
freedom of the high seas because its exercise is not without reasonable regard for
94. Id. art. 18 § 1(1) (reg. 725).
95. Id.
96. Id. art. 21 §§ 1-3 (regs. 838-44).
97. Id. art. 21 § 1(3) (reg. 840).
98. Id. arts. 21 § 2(1) (reg. 842), 16 §§ 1-3 (regs. 719-21).
99. See Baxter, Treatles and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 25, 99-101 (1970).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
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the interests of other states in their exercise of a freedom of the high seas.10 The
interference that the European states were in fact concerned with had much more
to do with the invasion of the domestic airwaves by broadcasting signals contrary
to established national and international regulatory schemes than it did with the
freedom of seas,' 0 2 whether that invasion was in the form of actual radio-fre-
quency interference with the signals of authorized stations or was the intrusion of




At this point, a brief recapitulation of the points already developed is in order
before proceeding to consider the legal bases which coastal states have or could
have used to control pirate radio broadcasting.
- Pirate radio broadcasting stations, operated from ships or fixed platforms
beyond the territorial limits of any state, flourished in the 1960's in European
waters because they met a programming demand not fulfilled by European
domestic stations.
- Broadcasting from floating objects (vessels) outside national territories (on
the high seas) is arguably a freedom of the high seas under the High Seas Conven-
tion but is contrary to the radio regulations of the ITU.
- Enforcement of the radio regulations is a function of the individual states
which are parties to the International Telecommunication Convention. For sta-
tions operating from ships outside national territory, the appropriate enforcing
state is the state of registration (flag state) of the ship, which may or may not be a
party to the convention and may or may not be disposed to take enforcement
measures.
- Nonflag states normally do not have prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction
over ships outside their national territory.
-The jurisdictional status of platforms fixed to the bottom of the sea outside a
national jurisdiction and intended for uses other than exploration or exploitation
of the natural resources of the continental shelf is unclear. International law does
not prescribe which, if any, state has jurisdiction over them or activities conducted
on them.
With these points as background, the various legal theories that states have
adopted or could adopt to suppress or control pirate broadcasting stations may be
examined.
101. High Seas Convention, supra note 50, art. 2.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 31-49.
Page 71: Winter 1982]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
VII
LEGAL THEORIES AVAILABLE FOR THE CONTROL OF PIRATE
BROADCASTING
A. Territorial Jurisdiction
The most pervasive jurisdiction exercised by a state is that exercised within its
territory. There, a state's jurisdiction is complete and exclusive, extending to all
persons, places, and activities. 0 3 There is no question that any state may punish
infringements of its laws occurring within its territory regardless of the nationality
of the person or entity committing the act. 104 For this purpose, the territorial sea is
just as much a part of a state as its land territory'0 5 and, except for the right of
innocent passage and the limited immunity which that right gives to foreign ships
while in such passage, 0 6 is just as fully subject to the sovereignty of the state.107
It is obvious, then, that pirate stations would not consciously attempt to
operate from within the territorial sea of a coastal state. Ship-based pirate stations
cruised or anchored just outside the territorial waters of the target state'0 and the
fixed platforms constructed by broadcasters or the abandoned antiaircraft towers
they occupied were also all outside the territorial sea.10 9 But even where a pirate
broadcasting station was physically located outside the territory of a state, utiliza-
tion of territorial jurisdiction theories afforded the state several methods of pro-
ceeding against it. Most states have traditionally exercised prescriptive
jurisdiction over events taking place partly within their territory and partly
outside.' 10 Some states have been more conservative in this regard than others,
but international law does not restrain a state in its exercise of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion over preparatory or supporting acts within its territory, even if the final acts
rendering the event complete occur outside the territory." Neither does interna-
103. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 17-20 (1965).
104. RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, §§ 17, 20.
105. Id. § 11.
106. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 61, arts. 1, 14-23.
107. Id. art. 1.
108. P. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 207-13.
109. Hunnings, supra note 2, at 422-23; van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 14, at 303. Great
Britain's initial efforts to close down pirate stations on abandoned Martello towers in the Thames Estuary
in 1964 were aborted because the towers were outside the three mile limit measured from the traditional
baselines used by Great Britain. Hunnings, supra note 2, at 423. After the Territorial Sea Convention
became effective as to Great Britain, however, the government adopted bay closing lines authorized by
article 7 of the convention by Order in Council. The Territorial Waters Order in Council, 1964, STAT.
INST. app. 6452A (1965). This brought the towers within the territorial sea. They then came within the
prohibition of the Marine, &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act, 1967, ch. 41, § 2(l)(a) which makes it
unlawful to broadcast from "a structure in [the territorial sea of] the United Kingdom, being a structure
affixed to, or supported by, the bed of those waters and not being a ship." Id. § 2 1(a), (b), § 2(2). The
British Government was then able to close down the pirate stations on the Martello towers. See P. HARRIS,
supra note 9, at 121-26. The British Marine, &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act, 1967 is summarized in Pirate
Broadcasting, supra note 35, at 806-10.
110. See, e.g., Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 435, 484-87, 495-503; RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 17. Prescriptive jurisdiction is used
here in the same sense as it is used in RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 6 comment.
111. RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 17.
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tional law restrain a state from adopting a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to an act occurring outside a state but having effects inside the territory.' 1 2
Under either of these theories, a target state would have considerable legal
leverage over pirate radio broadcasting beamed at it. Because such a broadcasting
enterprise could continue to operate only if it attracted enough advertising in the
target state to meet its operating expenses and only if it received the necessary
supporting services (fuel, food, personnel transport and operator rotation) from
shore, sanctions against such activities would be effective in forcing a pirate out of
existence."13 While some of the services might come from third countries,'1 4 it is
almost unavoidable that advertising revenue would have to come from the target
state," 5 for only advertisers of products or services sold in that state could hope to
reap any benefit from radio advertising. It was, in fact, the case that all of the
successful pirate stations in the 1960's had corporate headquarters or advertising
branches or agencies within the target states." 6  It was also true that most of the
pirates were supplied and serviced from the ports of the target states." 7 Clearly, if
those states had had the political will and public support to enact legislation
directed at the supplying and servicing of these stations, they would have not been
acting contrary to international law. Indeed, this was the means eventually
adopted by Great Britain to close down the pirates operating from ships off its
coasts, but that action did not occur until after the member states of the Council of
Europe adopted a convention obligating themselves to take such action."I8
In a similar fashion, the objective-territorial theory of jurisdiction would have
provided a legal basis for action against the pirates under certain circumstances.
Under this theory, a state has prescriptive jurisdiction over acts occurring outside
its territory if the conduct causes a direct, foreseeable and substantial effect within
the territory, and either (1) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as
criminal or tortious, or (2) the prohibitory rule is not inconsistent with generally
accepted principles of justice." 19
While a state might not have been able to prescribe a rule against pirate radio
broadcasting under the first of these criteria (criminal or tortious conduct), the
second seems clearly to have been met. Pirate radio broadcasts did create substan-
tial effects within the target state. They took audiences away from authorized
112. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10; see Harvard Research, supra note 110, at 487-94;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 18.
113. See, e.g., P. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 9. Radio Caroline was tended from Harwich. Caroline's
parent company had offices in Mayfair. Id. at 16.
114. After passage of the British Marine, &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act, 1967, Caroline was tended
from, and its offices moved to, Amsterdam. Id. at 190.
115. Companies whose advertisements were heard over pirate radio stations after the passage of the
British Marine, &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act, 1967, denied that they had purchased airtime. Their
overseas parent companies also denied paying for airtime. Both forms of payment were illegal under the
act. Holden, Atticus, Sunday Times (London), July 31, 1977, at 32, col. 1.
116. See supra note 114.
117. Id.
118. Hunnings, supra note 2, at 422, 433. The convention, European Agreement for the Prevention of
Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories, Jan. 22, 1965, 634 U.N.T.S. 239, is
reprinted in Hunnings at 434-36. The British action was also deferred until the enactment of the British
Marine, &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act, 1967, supra note 109.
119. RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 18. See also Harvard Research, supra note 110, at 487-94.
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stations, they often caused electronic interference with authorized uses, they
injected a type of programming that was objectionable to the prevailing social
order, and they sometimes introduced commercial broadcasting where only non-
commercial had been approved. 20 These intrusions were contrary to fundamental
broadcasting policies adopted in most European states. And finally, as they were
contrary to widely accepted international conventions, their prohibition could
hardly be said to have been inconsistent with generally accepted principles of
justice. t 2 1
The difficulty with use of the objective-territorial theory, however, lies not in
the prescriptive right of the state but rather in enforcement. While prescriptive
jurisdiction is the sine qua non of enforcement jurisdiction, 12 2 prescriptive jurisdic-
tion alone is not sufficient to permit enforcement. ' 23 Some further connection with
the territorial state is required.' 24 As the Permanent Court of International Justice
stated in The Lotus,' 25 a state may exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction outside its
territory unless there is some rule of international law which prohibits it from
doing so, but that jurisdiction "cannot be exercised [enforced] by a State outside
its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom
or from a convention."'' 26
The usual permissive rule or basis for enforcement is territorial. That is, a state
has jurisdiction to enforce withn its territory a law validly prescribed by it and
governing conduct outside its territory.' 27 Such a permissive rule might also be
derived for fixed-platform stations from the continental shelf doctrine, but as has
been seen, the national status of platforms not used for exploitation of the
120. See supra text accompanying notes 31-49.
121. An argument might be constructed that such a prohibition would conflict with emerging princi-
ples concerning the freedom of communication across international boundaries. Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948), states that "everyone has the right
to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes [the] freedom . ..to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless ofjfonters" (emphasis added). Article 19(2) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) states, "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless offrontiers, . ..
through any. . . media of his choice" (emphasis added). Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950), contains a provision
almost identical to the words of article 19 of the Universal Declaration, but it is qualified by the statement
"This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises." Id This is in accordance with radio regulation 725: "No transmitting station may be estab-
lished or operated by a private person or any enterprise without a license issued by the government of the
country to which the station is subject." Radio Regulation, Dec. 21, 1959, supra note 28, art. 18 § I (reg.
"725).
For broadcasting stations within national territory then, the nations of the world appear to agree that
the principle of freedom of communication must yield to the interest of avoidance of mutual interference.
This apparently applies to broadcasting stations on the high seas as well, although, as has been indicated, a
tenuous argument could be made that for nonparties to the ITU Regulations, broadcasting might be a
freedom of the high seas. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102. But see Tammes, supra note 73, at 39.
122. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10; RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 7(2) comment b.
123. RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 7(1).
124. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, §§ 20 (within territory), 25 (by agreement), 32 (on board
ships or aircraft of nationality of prescribing state).
125. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10.
126. Id. at 18-19.
127. RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 20.
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resources of the seabed is ambiguous. 128 For ship-mounted stations, the nation-
ality of the ship might provide the permissive basis, but it would be quite easy for a
pirate station ship to avoid the coastal states' enforcement jurisdiction by adopting
a flag-of-convenience nationality.129 The presence of agents, employees or compo-
nents of the enterprise within the territory would thus seem to provide the best
basis for exercising enforcement jurisdiction, for, as already mentioned, most pirate
stations had substantial contact with the target state. Most maintained offices
within the target state engaged in advertisement solicitation and other administra-
tive activities; their broadcasting employees were local nationals who were ferried
to and from the station from nearby national ports, and most support activities
were carried out from nearby support bases in the target state. 130 Each of these
activities was a constituent element of the total operation. If a target state had
enacted legislation making it unlawful to operate a broadcasting station on the
high seas having a substantial effect within the territory of the state, or to aid or
abet its operation, there is no apparent reason why such legislation could not have
been enforced against those personnel and components of the operation that were
physically within the territory of the state.
B. Protective Jurisdiction
Closely related to the objective-territorial theory of jurisdiction but distinct
from it is the protective theory. Under this theory, a state has prescriptive jurisdic-
tion over conduct outside its territory that threatens its security or the operation of
its governmental functions if that conduct is generally recognized as criminal. 13 1 It
is not necessary that the effect of the conduct take place within the territory of the
state, although in the usual case it would. Neither is it necessary that the person or
entity against which the prescription is directed have the nationality of the pre-
scribing state. 132
The limits of conduct outside a state which falls within the range of this prin-
ciple are not clear. In U.S. practice, the principle has been used to proscribe per-
jury before an official abroad or the making of false statements in a visa
application. 133 The United States has never used the principle to make unlawful
the counterfeiting of money outside U.S. territory, however, although this is an
obviously appropriate use. 134 With regard to radio broadcasting, since the regula-
tion and control of the airways (and in the case of some European states the actual
operation of broadcasting facilities) are considered to be strictly governmental
functions, and since pirate broadcasting obviously threatens the operation of these
functions, the protective principle of jurisdiction would provide a basis for pre-
scriptive jurisdiction. As in the case of jurisdiction grounded on the objective-
128. See supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
129. See Pirate Broadcasting, supra note 35, at 812.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
131. RESTATEMENr, supra note 103, § 33.
132. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968).
133. 22 U.S.C. § 1203 (1976); see United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
936 (1968).
134. RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 33 reporter's note.
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territorial principle, enforcement would have to take place within the territory of
the prescribing state or be based on one of the other doctrines mentioned in the
earlier discussion of the territorial principle.' 35
The United Kingdom, the primary target of the 1960's-era pirates, has, how-
ever, been more conservative than the United States in relying on other-than-terri-
torial principles of jurisdiction. 136 Its conservatism is understandable given the
susceptibility of nonterritorial theories, such as the protective principle, to abuse
by virtually unlimited expansion. 13 7 It is thus unlikely that a state following such
conservative interpretations of jurisdiction would have adopted the protective
principle as a basis for suppressing pirate radio broadcasting. On the other hand,
most European states have been less reluctant than the British to utilize nonter-
ritorial theories of jursidiction, 138 and in light of their practices, the protective
principle would have provided them with a firm base for enforcement action
within the territory of the enforcing state.
C. Nationality as a Basis for Jurisdiction
Under current concepts of international law, nationality is also a basis for the
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, and in some cases, enforcement jurisdiction as
well. 139 Where a person, corporation, vessel or aircraft has the nationality of a
state, that state has jurisdiction to make rules governing the conduct of that
person, corporation, vessel or aircraft. In addition, in the cases of ships and air-
craft, that state may make rules governing the conduct of non-nationals while on
board. 140 Where the conduct takes place on the high seas, the jurisdiction of the
state of nationality would normally be exclusive, but if conduct occurs within the
territory of another state or in a place where that other state exercises some form of
jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction might exist. 14 1 Concurrent jurisdiction may
also exist where the conduct of a national of one state takes place on board a ship
or aircraft having the nationality of a second state. 142
135. See supra text accompanying notes 103-30.
136. RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 33 reporter's note. See also supra note 109.
137. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 13, 1951, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, [19521 Nederlandse Juris-
prudentie [N.J.) 42; Public Prosecutor v. L, 18 INT'L L. REP. 206 (Netherlands 1951). Great Britain's
conservatism with respect to extensions of jurisdiction seaward during the period the radio pirates were
active is understandable when viewed in light of other law of the sea controversies Britain was engaged in
during this period. The continuing dispute with Iceland over the extent of Iceland's fisheries jurisdiction
was perhaps the foremost of these. Obviously a desire not to provide Iceland with a precedent of unilateral
claim to ocean jurisdiction served as a deterrent to any claim by the British Government to exercise juris-
diction beyond the traditional three mile limit. In addition, all of the maritime states were engaged in a
holding action to preserve a narrow territorial sea and to fight off continuing encroachments on the
freedom of the seas through myriad claims to special zones and regimes of exclusive national jurisdiction.
138. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 13, 1951, supra note 137; French Code of Criminal Protection (1925),
art. 7, quoted in translation in 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 270 (1968).
139. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); RESTATEMENT, rupra note 103, §§ 31, at 32. See
J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
125-26 (2d ed. 1981) for a brief survey of the practices of states as to the exercise of prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction based on the nationality principle. See also L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACITER
& H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 445-47 (1980), for a similar summary.
140. RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, §§ 30-32.
141. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10; High Seas Convention, supra note 50, arts. 6, 11.
142. Enforcement jurisdiction at sea, however, could be exercised only by the flag state. High Seas
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The nationality principle of jurisdiction thus presents considerable potential
power to a state attempting to suppress pirate radio broadcasting. Such a state
could, without violating international law, enact domestic legislation or regula-
tions making it unlawful for one of its nationals (personal or corporate) to operate
a pirate radio station, to aid or assist in the operation, to advertise on the station,
to be employed by the station, or to do any of the myriad things required to keep a
station in operation. Additionally, a state could prohibit any ship or aircraft
having its nationality from permitting a broadcasting station to be operated on
board by anyone of any nationality and could here, as above, prohibit ships or
aircraft from aiding or abetting the operation of a station by acting in any sort of
tender- or supply-ship capacity.143
Enforcement under the nationality theory would be less of a problem than
under either of the theories previously discussed because enforcement jurisdiction
follows prescriptive jurisdiction as to nationals on the high seas. 14 4 As to fixed
platforms, the ambiguous status of which has already been described, the coastal
state would.be free to proceed against any activities conducted by its nationals on
board. Shipboard stations, however, would present a problem if the ship were
registered in any state other than the state attempting enforcement action.
Although the state of nationality's laws would, in theory at least, reach the
national on board, the foreign flag of the ship would shield the national and all
activities and persons on board from investigation or enforcement by the nonflag
state as long as the ship remained on the high seas. 145 Since most ships housing
pirate stations would choose to register 'in states other than the state off whose
coast they are operating,' 4 6 the coastal state would usually be frustrated in its
enforcement efforts against the ship itself. It could, nevertheless, as in the case of
enforcement actions under objective-territorial or protective principles, fall back
on enforcement against those persons and constituent activities of the broadcasting
operation that might be found within its own territory. 4 7
Of course, a broadcasting station might be operated as a totally foreign enter-
prise-foreign flag ship, foreign corporation, foreign personnel, foreign advertisers,
support from foreign bases, etc.-in which case jurisdiction based on nationality
would be of no use to the target state. But the prospects for a station's long-term
survival under those circumstances would appear to be small, 48 and the circum-
stances themselves unlikely.
Convention, supra note 50, arts. 6, 11. Cf. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, supra note 52, art. 11.
143. Enforcement action based on these principles, as well as on territorial jurisdiction, was the theory
on which the European Agreement on Pirate Broadcasting, supra note 118, was based. Each party's use of
conventional principles of territorial jurisdiction and jurisdiction over nationals in a cooperative way ulti-
mately proved effective in closing down pirate broadcasting. See tnfra text accompanying notes 180-85.
144. High Seas Convention, supra note 50, art. 6; Cf. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 51, at
795.
145. High Seas Convention, supra note 50, art. 6.
146. Radio Caroline was reported to be unregistered; "Caroline South" was reported to be registered
in Panama. Smith speculates that both had second countries of registration to which they could resort in
an emergency. Pirate Broadcasting, supra note 35, at 811-12.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 108-18, 143.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15. But Radio Caroline continued to broadcast for some
time following the enactment of the British Marine, &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act, 1967, apparently by
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A variation of the nationality principle was adopted by the Scandinavian states
to enable them to take more effective action against radio pirates off their shores.
On recommendation of the Nordic Council, the governments of Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden passed substantially identical legislation
against pirate broadcasting. A feature common to each nation's legislation was a
provision that the nationals of any of the five countries were to be treated as if they
were nationals of the legislating state. 149 This jurisdiction-by-consent greatly
expanded the reach of their prescriptive acts and removed impediments to enforce-
ment that might have been caused by the foreign nationality of the person, ship or
corporation.150
D. Contiguous Zone Jurisdiction
A jurisdictional theory that at first glance might appear to have some applica-
bility to the control of pirate radio stations is the contiguous zone concept.' 5 1 On
closer examination, however, its principles, at least those codified in the 1958 Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,' 52 do not provide a very
fruitful source of authority.
The contiguous zone concept authorizes a state to extend its jurisdiction
beyond the edge of its territorial sea. That jurisdiction is, however, limited in three
respects: (1) the competencies authorized are limited to four, namely, customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitary controls; 5 3 (2) the enforcement actions of the
coastal state are limited to preventing and punishing infringements committed
(i.e., having their effect) within the territory or territorial sea of the state; 54 and
(3) the outer limit may not extend more than twelve miles from the baseline from
which the territorial sea is measured. 55 The second of these limitations presents
no problem since the effects of the pirate radio broadcasting are meant to and do
have an effect within the territory of the coastal state.' 56 The other two limita-
tions, however, doom the usefulness of this jurisdictional theory in suppressing
pirate radio broadcasting. The twelve-mile outer boundary imposes a severe limi-
tation on the enforcement power of the coastal state. The requirement for the
broadcasting station to move out an additional nine miles' 57 would result in cer-
tain inconveniences (deeper water for anchoring, rougher seas for cruising) and
arranging for servicing and advertising outlets in a number of places outside Great Britain. See Pirate
Broadcastibg, supra note 35, at 811-12.
149. Hunnings, supra note 2, at 419.
150. The common Nordic legislation proved effective in eventually closing down the stations targeting
the Scandinavian states. However, Radio Syd proved extremely resilient, resuming transmission repeat-
edly after its director was fined for unauthorized possession of broadcasting equipment and even after he
was sentenced to imprisonment. Id. at 420.
151. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 61, art. 24.
152. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 61.
153. Id. art. 24(l)(a).
154. Id. art. 24(l)(a), (b).
155. Id. art. 24(2). The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, if adopted, would extend the outer
limit to 24 miles from the baseline. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.78, Aug. 28, 1981, art. 33(2).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
157. Or 12 miles beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea if the Draft Convention on the Law of
[Vol. 45: No. I
PIRATE RADIO BROADCASTING
would shorten the radio broadcaster's effective range by a corresponding distance.
Nevertheless, the effects probably would not hamper the broadcaster to such a
degree as to make the operation commercially infeasible. A pirate might be forced
to use more seaworthy vessels and to increase the power of the transmitters, but the
pirates have shown themselves able to cope with more serious problems than these.
The real limitation on the use of the contiguous zone concept as a potential basis
for controlling pirate radio broadcasting is that the contiguous zone, as shaped by
the International Law Commission and adopted in article 24 of the 1958 Conven-
tion on the Territorial and Contiguous Zone, is a narrow, rigid, and what
McDougal and Burke describe as "decidedly anachronistic" version of a concept
which traditionally and by state practice has been flexible and dynamic. 158  The
competencies which a coastal state may exercise are limited to the protection of
four named categories of interests (customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation).
Although it has been suggested that a state might use the contiguous zone as a
means of controlling pirate broadcasting by analogizing pirate broadcasting to the
categories of interests named in article 24,159 such a stretching of the article seems
directly contrary to its wording and entirely inconsistent with the history of its
development. As pointed out by McDougal and Burke, the article reflects princi-
pally the views of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, then an influential member of the ILC,
who in turn reflected the consistent conservative attitude of Great Britain toward
extending national authority beyond the territorial sea.160 Given this history and
these limitations, it is not surprising then that none of the states targeted by pirate
broadcasters used the contiguous zone as a legal basis for enforcement action
against such broadcasters.
E. Universal Jurisdiction
As previously mentioned, the Convention on the High Seas provides that the
authorities of any state may seize a pirate ship or aircraft on the high seas and that
the courts of the seizing state may decide upon the penalties to be imposed on the
pirates and the action to be taken against the ships, aircraft and property seized,
subject to the rights of the third parties acting in good faith., 6 1 This "universal"
jurisdiction is justified on the basis that it is in the interests of all states to protect
commerce and navigation on the high seas. If radio pirates were pirates in the
legal sense, any state could exercise such enforcement jurisdiction. But radio
pirates do not fit within the definition of piracy in the convention.
Nevertheless, one might argue that since all states have a common interest in
preserving the public order of the airwaves over the oceans, the same rules should
be applied to broadcasting pirates by analogy. Merely to state the proposition,
however, is to refute it, for only the most extreme acts of violence and depredation
on the high seas have been defined as piracy and recognized as subjecting the
the Sea, supra note 155, is adopted, as article 3 of that convention adopts a 12 nautical mile breadth for the
territorial sea.
158. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 51, at 605.
159. hirate Broadcasting, supra note 35, at 779-80.
160. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 51, at 603-04. Set also supra note 137.
161. High Seas Convention, supra note 50, art. 19.
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perpetrators to the universal jurisdiction of all states. Piracy acquired that status
by virtue of customary international law. 162
A number of other activities have received nearly world wide condemnation. t63
These activities include slavery and engaging in the slave trade, traffic in women
for prostitution (white slavery), traffic in narcotic drugs, interference with subma-
rine cables, aircraft hijacking, genocide and crimes against the peace and security
of mankind. Most states are parties to treaties obligating them to cooperate in
suppressing such activities. 164 With the possible exceptions of slavery, genocide
and war crimes,' 65 enforcement jurisdiction over these activities is still dependent
upon either some other basis of jurisdiction (such as nationality of the ship or
person, or territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime occurred)
or on treaty arrangements conferring jurisdiction on parties to the treaties.
Although a great deal of study by both public bodies and individual scholars has
been devoted to the creation of an international criminal law, it cannot be said
that international law has developed to the point that it comprehends as crimes
against international law acts other than piracy, and perhaps, as mentioned, geno-
cide, war crimes and engaging in slave trade. Other "international" crimes are
really violations of domestic law, to which the principle of territoriality of criminal
jurisdiction is not recognized as a limiting factor, and which are defined as crimes
by the laws of most states (offenses communisJurs). 166
162. The principle is of course now codified in the High Seas Convention, supra note 50, art. 19.
163. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 34 reporter's note 2.
164. Slavery: Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S.
No. 778,60 L.N.T.S. 253; Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, T.I.A.S.
No. 3532, 182 U.N.T.S. 51; High Seas Convention, supra note 50, art. 22. White slavery: Agreement for the
Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 18, 1904, 35 Star. 1909, T.S. No. 496, I L.N.T.S. 83. Traffic in
narcotic drugs: Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 25, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298,
520 U.N.T.S. 204. Interference with submarine cables: Convention for the Protection of Submarine
Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, 24 Stat. 989, T.S. No. 380; High Seas Convention, supra note 50, art. 27. Aircraft
hijacking: Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, supra note 52,
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), supra note 52. Genocide:
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(the United States is not a party). Crimes against the peace and security of mankind (including war
crimes): See G.A. Res. 95 (I), Dec. 11, 1946 (Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized
by the Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal). The General Assembly requested the International Law Com-
mission to "formulate" the Nurnberg principles in a general codification of offenses against the peace and
security of mankind or as an international code. I U.N. GAOR (Resolutions, 2d part) 188, U.N. Doc.
A/64 (Add. 1) [1946-1947] U.N.Y.B. 254-55. The effort came to nothing, however. G.A. Res. 897 (IX), 9
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954). For a summary of the viewpoints of a
number of scholars on this aborted effort, see II M. WHITEMAN, supra note 138, at 835-48; 1 id. at 201-07.
See also the 1949 Geneva Conventions relative to Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, to
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, to Prisoners of War, and to Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3250, 3336, 3516, T.I.A.S. Nos. 3362,
3363, 3364, 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135, 287. The four Geneva Conventions are supplemented by two
additional protocols adopted at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Devel-
opment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, Geneva, June 8, 1977, U.N.
Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I and II, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1391 (1977). The additional
protocols entered into force on December 7, 1978. As of the time of preparation of this article, the United
States was not a party to the additional protocols.
165. Judgment of May 29, 1962, Sup. Ct. of Israel, [1962] 16 Piske Din 2033 (in Hebrew); Attorney
General of Israel v. Eichmann, Judgment of Supreme Court of Israel, May 29, 1962, 36 INT'L L. REP. 277,
298-304 (1968). See RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, § 34 reporter's note 2.
166. See Parry, Some Considerations Upon the Content fa Drafi Code of Ofences Against the Peace and Security of
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As shall be seen below, even when the European states adopted a regional
treaty on pirate broadcasting, they stopped short of bottoming enforcement on a
universal jurisdiction concept. 167 As shall also be seen, however, the Draft Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, emerging from the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, moves in the direction of universalizing jurisdiction
over broadcasting pirates. 16
F. The Dutch Approach
The Netherlands evolved a unique legal theory to support action it took
against pirate radio stations operating on fixed installations on its continental shelf
but outside its territorial sea. Relying upon the work of an advisory commission
on international law under the chairmanship of Professor J.P.A. Francois,169 the
Netherlands Government enacted domestic legislation empowering its national
authorities to act unilaterally against such installations., 70 The claim to jurisdic-
tion was based on the interlocking of three separate legal theories: the legal
vacuum theory, the protection of legal interests theory and the notion of conti-
guity. As explained by van Panhuys and van Emde Boas, the Francois Commis-
sion and the Netherlands Government reasoned that "[t]he absence of territorial
sovereignty over the high seas has never meant, nor does it mean, that interna-
tional law should tolerate a vacuum of legal authority or law.' 71 The permissive
rules of international law therefore permit activities on the high seas to be regu-
lated by national states (as, for example, ships by the authority of their flag state,
or installations on the continental shelf for exploitation of the shelf's resources by
their coastal state). The determination of which state is entitled to exercise juris-
diction, to fill the legal vacuum, in the case of installations on the continental shelf
not for exploration or exploitation of the resources depends on two subsidiary prin-
ciples-the protection of legal interests, and the notion of contiguity. 172
According to the Netherlands Government, under the protection-of-legal-inter-
ests principle a state is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction outside its territory to
protect certain legal interests, either those of the state itself (as, for example, the
interests of the state in its regulatory control of the airwaves) or of the interna-
tional community (as, for example, the international regulatory scheme for radio
broadcasting). 1 3 In its justification for its legislation, the Netherlands Govern-
ment distinguished between the protection of "legal" interests and the protection
of "vital" interests, such as self-defense. Actions to protect the latter could take
place anywhere in the world, "albeit within the confines of international law,"
while the former were more narrowly confined geographically (as, for example, to
Mankznd, 3 INT'L L.Q. 208, 211 (1950). For a sampling of the diversity of views on this subject see II M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 138, at 835-48.
167. See infra text accompanying note 183.
168. See in/a text accompanying notes 186-99.
169. See van Panhuys & van Erode Boas, supra note 14, at 315.
170. The North Sea Installations Act, Staatsblad 1964 No. 447, English transation printed as Annex
to van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 14, at 340-41.
171. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 14, at 332.
172. Id. at 333-34.
173. Id. at 333.
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the continental shelf). 174 Even where so confined, however, the possibility of juris-
dictional conflicts remained, since other states might purport to exercise jurisdic-
tion under some other permissive theory of international law. Any such conflicts
would then be solved by the second subsidiary principle of the legal vacuum
theory, the notion of contiguity. 175
The notion of contiguity suggests that for installations on the continental shelf,
the nearest coastal state to the installation should have legal authority in prefer-
ence to any other state. Such a jurisdiction is consistent with and analogous to
existing jurisdictions in the contiguous zone, on the continental shelf and in off-
shore fishing zones. If coastal state jurisdiction is necessary in those instances to
'protect the domestic and international legal order, then a similar necessity exists
for installations on the continental shelf. 176 The Netherlands Government insisted
that such coastal state jurisdiction would be primary even though another state
might be the owner of the installation. A fortiori, it would apply if the installation
was privately owned.177
The Netherlands Government carried its notion of contiguity one step further,
arguing that the coastal state had a responsibhty as well as a right to exercise juris-
diction over fixed installations on the continental shelf. This responsibility
required it to exercise its jurisdiction in such a way as to protect international
interests that were not otherwise protected, here the international regulatory
scheme for radio broadcasting. 78
Following enactment of the Netherlands North Sea Installations Act, Nether-
lands authorities landed on the R.E.M. broadcasting installation and closed down
its transmitter. No other state protested this action. 79
VIII
THE EUROPEAN AGREEMENT FOR THE PREVENTION
OF PIRATE BROADCASTING
As the foregoing discussion indicates, each coastal state troubled by the pres-
ence of offshore pirate broadcasters had adequate means within the arsenal of legal
theories available to it under the permissive rules of international law to take effec-
tive enforcement actions against such broadcasters. The most effective measures
probably would have been those that were directed against activities undertaken
within the state's territory, as, for example, cutting off supplies and services or
outlawing purchase of advertising by persons or entities within the territory of the
coastal state. In the end, those were the measures actually adopted by the British
Government, 180 and they proved effective, 18 1 but the British chose not to act until
174. Id.
175. Id. at 334.
176. Id. at 334-35.
177. Id. at 335.
178. Id. at 335.
179. Id. at 336.
180. British Marine, &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act, 1967, supra note 109, §§ 3-5.
181. See P. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 165-95.
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the member states of the Council of Europe had adopted the European Agreement
for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from Outside National Territories of
January 22, 1965. 12 That agreement, which entered into force October 19, 1967,
represented the cooperative response of the European community to its common
problem of pirate broadcasting. Rather than adopting some new or revolutionary
theory of enforcement, however, the agreement signified merely a mutual under-
taking actually to take the appropriate measures which traditional theories of
jurisdiction already allowed against acts or actors within their territory or other-
wise subject to their jurisdiction. 8 3
Although the preamble to the agreement makes it clear that the parties are
concerned about illegal broadcasting stations established on objects affixed to the
seabeds as well as those on board ships, aircraft or other floating or airborne
objects, article 1 limits the obligation of the parties to act only against those sta-
tions operated on floating or airborne objects. Article 4, however, permits, but
does not obligate, the parties to apply the provisions of the agreement "to broad-
casting stations installed or maintained on objects affixed to or supported by the
bed of the sea."
The key provisions of the agreement are contained in articles 2 and 3. Article 2
obligates each party to make punishable as offenses against its domestic law the
establishment or operation of pirate stations installed or maintained on board
ships, aircraft, or other floating or airborne objects, as well as knowing acts of
collaboration. It then defines collaboration as including any of the following acts:
(i) the provision, maintenance or repairing of equipment;
(ii) the provision of supplies;
(iii) the provision of transportation for or transporting persons, equipment or
supplies;
(iv) the ordering or production of any material, including advertisements, to
be broadcast; and
(v) the provision of services concerning advertising for the benefit of the
stations.
Article 3 obligates each party to apply the provisions of the agreement to both
its nationals who have committed any of the acts referred to in article 2 on its
territory, ships or aircraft or other floating or airborne objects, and to non-nationals
who have committed any such acts on its territory or ships or aircraft or floating or
airborne objects under its jurisdiction.
It can be seen, then, that the agreement created no new form of jurisdiction.
What it did was obligate the parties to exercise the most universally accepted
forms of national jurisdiction (territorial jurisdiction, jurisdiction over nationals,
and jurisdiction over ships and aircraft having the nationality of the state) to make
certain acts connected with pirate broadcasting unlawful and to enforce those laws
within their territory against their nationals or on board ships or aircraft having
their nationality.
182. European Agreement on Pirate Broadcasting, supra note 118.
183. Id. arts. 2, 3.
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While any individual state was already empowered to take any of those actions
on its own, by providing uniformity and concert of action the agreement made acts
by individual states more effective. If, for example, a pirate station targeting a
continental state was being supported logistically from Great Britain, the British
government would have been obligated to exercise its jurisdiction to terminate
such support. Although one method of shutting down the station would have been
to proceed against its advertisers, most of whom would probably have been in the
target state, the complexity of corporate structures and product-distribution net-
works might have made it difficult to track down and prosecute the actual adver-
tiser.18 4 Those who provided support services and persons directly connected with
the operation of the station, on the other hand, would have been relatively easy to
identify and prosecute.
More important than providing a jurisdictional framework for enforcement
actions against pirate stations, however, was what the agreement represented. It
was a collective statement of will to eradicate what had become a persistent source
of disruption of the region's public order of the airwaves. By stiffening the back-




THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OF THE THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
The preceding discussion has indicated that states targeted by pirate radio sta-
tions have at hand adequate jurisdictional bases for effective control measures
against such stations, either through direct action against the stations or their plat-
forms or through indirect actions against their suppliers, advertisers and other sup-
porting structures. The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, ' 8 6 if adopted and
entered into force, will provide at least two additional jurisdictional bases on
which direct action could be predicated.
The first of these is contained in the Draft Convention's provisions on the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and would be applicable to stations located on
artificial structures attached to the seabed.' 8 7 The second is an article in the high
seas part of the Draft Convention specifically directed to the problem of unauthor-
ized broadcasting stations located on the high seas or in the exclusive economic
zone. 188
Part V of the Draft Convention creates a new zone of the ocean, the exclusive
economic zone. This zone is adjacent to but beyond the territorial sea to a limit of
184. See supra note 115. Radio Caroline adopted a number of artifices, including inserting "dummy"
commercial messages among genuine ones, to make enforcement more difficult. See P. HARRIS, supra note
9, at 177-94.
185. See P. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 165-95.
186. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 155.
187. Id. part V, arts. 55-75.
188. Id. art. 109. The provisions of article 109 will apply mutalir mutandis to the exclusive economic
zone by virtue of article 58(2). See inf/a note 200.
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200 miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured and is gov-
erned by a specific regime as set forth in that part. 18 9 The purpose of the regime is
to establish the sovereign rights of the coastal state in this zone for the exploration
and economic exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed, subsoil, and
water column, and for other activities such as the generation of energy. 190 In order
to effect this purpose, the coastal state is given the exclusive right to construct and
to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures for the purposes mentioned above "and other economic
purposes."' 19 1 Although the drafters of the convention do not appear to have had
pirate radio stations in mind when they included these provisions, 9 2 their terms
are drawn in sufficiently broad language to include such radio stations in their
coverage. Unlike the provisions in the Continental Shelf Convention concerning
structures on the shelf,193 which limit coastal state jurisdiction over artificial instal-
lations to those "necessary for [the shelf's] exploration and the exploitation of its
natural resources,"' 194 the Draft Convention grants to the coastal state the exclu-
sive right, without qualification, to "construct and to authorize and regulate the
construction, operation and use" 19 5 of the artificial islands. ' 96 As to the other artifi-
cial installations or structures, the authority of the coastal state is almost equally
broad, limited only by the requirement that such installation or structures be con-
structed "for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic pur-
poses." 197  Since the use of an artificial installation or structure for a radio
broadcasting station would appear to be for an "economic purpose," the grant of
authority to the coastal state would appear to include jurisdiction to regulate such
use without trying to draw any precise distinctions as to whether the structure on
which the station is located is an "artificial island" or some other type of "installa-
tion or structure."' 198
It would thus appear that the Draft Convention provides a heretofore unavail-
able jurisdictional basis for coastal state exercise of control over pirate radio sta-
tions located on platforms fixed to the seabed. Construing the provisions of part V
in this manner does not appear to stretch them beyond their intended bounds nor
to do violence to traditional notions of the proper limits for extraterritorial exercise
of enforcement jurisdiction by coastal states. The necessity for employment of this
189. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 155, part V, arts. 55, 57.
190. Id. art. 56(1)(a).
191. Id. art. 60(l)(a), (b).
192. The inclusion of article 109, directed specifically to the pirate radio problem, would lend support
to this conclusion. See in/fta text accompanying notes 199-212.
193. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 64, art. 5 § 2.
194. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67, 85.
195. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 155, art. 60(1).
196. Id. art. 60(1)(a).
197. Id. art. 60(l)(b). See supra text accompanying notes 190-9 1.
198. The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea does not appear to contain any statement as to
what constitutes an "artificial island" as opposed to an "installation" or "structure." Except for the separa-
tion of the terms in subsections (a) and (b) of article 60(1), the terms appear in tandem wherever used in
parts V and VI of the Draft Convention. See Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 155, arts.
56, 60, 79, 80.
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theory does not seem pressing, however, in the light of the more explicit provisions
of article 109.
Article 109 of the Draft Convention reads:
1. All States shall co-operate in the suppression of unauthorized broadcasting from the
high seas.
2. For the purposes of this Convention, "unauthorized broadcasting" means the trans-
mission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on the high seas
intended for reception by the general public contrary to international regulations, but
excluding the transmission of distress calls.
3. Any person engaged in unauthorized broadcasting may be prosecuted before the
court of:
(a) the flag State of the ship;
(b) the State of registry of the installation;
(c) the State of which the person is a national;
(d) any State where the transmission can be received; or
(e) any State where authorized radio communication is suffering interference.
4. On the high seas, a State having jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 3 may,
in conformity with article 110, arrest any person or ship engaged in unauthorized broad-
casting and seize the broadcasting apparatus. 1
9 9
An examination of the article's provisions discloses that it accomplishes several
purposes. First of all, paragraph 1 places an obligation on all states (parties) to
cooperate in suppression of unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas. 2°°
Unauthorized broadcasting is defined broadly and in terms consistent with the
international regulatory scheme discussed earlier (paragraph 2). Unauthorized
broadcasting includes both radio and television broadcasting, and appropriately
excepts distress calls.
Second, paragraph 3 establishes (or confirms, as the case may be) that
prosecutorial jurisdiction may be exercised by states under several different cir-
cumstances. Exercise of such jurisdiction by the flag state of the vessel or the state
of nationality of the persons involved is, as has been seen, consistent with tradi-
tional concepts of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Although the Draft Convention
does not provide specifically for national registration of fixed installations and
structures on the seabed of the continental shelf or in the exclusive economic zone,
the plenary authority granted over such structures to the coastal state presumably
includes the right to require registration within some state (and perhaps within the
coastal state) as a condition for construction on the shelf or within the EEZ. 20 1
Exercise of jurisdiction by the state of registration parallels flag-state jurisdiction
over ships. The exercise of jurisdiction by a state where the transmissions can be
heard or where authorized transmission is suffering interference can probably be
fitted within the objective territorial or protective theories of jurisdiction.
In order to exercise its prosecutorial jurisdiction effectively, however, a state
199. Id art. 109.
200. Although article 109 refers only to broadcasting from the high seas, its provisions are made appli-
cable to the exclusive economic zone by article 58(2) which provides, "Articles 88 to 115 and other perti-
nent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible
with this [exclusive economic zone] Part." Id art. 58(2). Thus, there is no hiatus between the outer edge
of the territorial sea and the beginning of the high seas at the outer edge of the exclusive economic zone.
201. See id arts. 60, 80.
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must somehow obtain physical control over the person or ship involved. Para-
graph 4 provides authority for states to accomplish this. In a radical departure
from traditional notions of the freedom of the seas, paragraph 4 provides that
states having jurisdiction to prosecute under paragraph 3 may arrest any person or
ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting apparatus.
Such arrest and seizure is accomplished through the exercise of the right of visit by
warships or military aircraft (or other clearly marked ships or aircraft on govern-
ment service) pursuant to article 110.
This grant of authority to nonflag states represents a major departure from the
freedom of the seas. The exclusive jurisdiction of flag states over their ships while
on the high seas has been for centuries a jealously guarded principle to which only
a very few exceptions have been recognized.2 0 2 Only where ships have been
engaged in such flagrant abuses as piracy or sailing without evidence of nationality
have states been willing to admit the right of warships of other states to stop and
board their ships on the high seas. 20 3 Even engaging in the slave trade was not
recognized as a basis for such action, in the absence of a specific treaty, until the
1958 Convention on the High Seas. 20 4 In view of this history, it would be expected
that article 109 would have been highly controversial at the conference, but this
does not appear to have been the case.
Article 109 was derived from a proposal submitted to the conference by nine
states of the European Economic Community at the first negotiating session of the
conference in Caracas in 1974.205 The only apparent references to the proposal in
the official debates of the conference are a brief reference to the subject by the
United Kingdom during the debate on the high seas,206 and an equally brief
explanation of the proposal by the United Kingdom representative on behalf of its
sponsors, in which he merely stated that he "hoped that its provisions would be
included in any further working document on the subject. ' 20 7 The proposal
evoked no opposition and was included in the series of negotiating texts and the
Draft Convention without substantive change or further discussion. 208
202. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 9) at 1, art. 46 commentary 1, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 253, 284, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/ADD.l [hereinafter cited as ILC Report]; M.
McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 51, at 870-72, 1057-66.
203. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 51, at 870-72, 1057-66.
204. High Seas Convention, supra note 50, art. 22. See ILC Report, supra note 202, art. 46 commen-
tary l(ii), [1956] 2 Y.B. INrr'L L.COMM'N at 284.
205. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.54, art. 21, 3 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea Official Records 230 (1974) [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS III OR].
206. Statement of Mr. Anderson (United Kingdom), Aug. 12, 1974, 2 id. at 237.
207. Statement of Mr. Dudgeon (United Kingdom), Aug. 14, 1974, 2 id at 289-90.
208. Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/ Part II, art. 95, 4 UNCLOS
III OR, supra note 205, at 166; Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/ WP.8/
Rev.I/Part II, art. 97; 5 UNCLOS III OR, supra note 205, at 168; Informal Composite Negotiating Text,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP. 10, July 15, 1977, art. 109; Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 1,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/ WP.10/Rev.1, Apr. 28, 1979, art. 109; Informal Composite Negotiating
Text/Revision 2, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.2, Apr. 1I, 1980, art. 109; Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea (Informal Text), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP. 10/Rev.3, art. 109. Subsequent to the pro-
mulgation of the Draft Convention (Informal Text), the Drafting Committee recommended certain non-
substantive changes in wording and rearrangement of the paragraphs of the article. These were adopted at
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LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The reasons that article 109 sailed through the conference so easily are not
readily evident. The officially recorded conference proceedings are silent on the
issue except for the brief references previously noted. 20 9 The problem addressed
by the article was certainly not an urgent one. The heyday of pirate broadcasters
in Northern Europe had long since passed, and the Northern European states that
sponsored the proposal seemed already to have solved by more conservative means
any problems that had previously existed there. 210 States that might have been
expected to oppose such a proposal may have been preoccupied with what they
perceived as more important issues such as passage through straits, fishing, deep
sea mining and the like. Other states not as troubled by encroachments on the
freedoms of the high seas may have seen this development as only one more mani-
festation of a conference trend to extend the reach of national jurisdictions of one
sort or another farther and farther to sea.21 ' Still others, troubled by propaganda
broadcasts aimed at them from the territories of other states, may have seen this as
an opportunity to establish the unlawfulness of such practices.2 1 2 Whatever the
reasons for its inclusion, however, article 109 establishes a troubling precedent. If
the nations of the world, particularly those that regard themselves as guardians of
the freedom of the seas, are willing to accept such a significant exception to the
principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state over ships on the high seas on
the basis of such weak justification to solve a largely nonexistent problem, other
steadfastly held principles may be in similar jeopardy. One can hope that article
109 does not represent a general trend away from exclusive flag-state jurisdiction,
but other developments in the conference would suggest that this is not the case. 2 13
X
CONCLUSION
Well-established international law theories of jurisdiction are flexible enough to
provide an effective array of enforcement mechanisms to any state targeted by a
commercial pirate radio or television station operating from a platform on the
high seas floating or affixed to the seabed. No new or exotic theories need to be
invented to allow a state to close down a troublesome pirate. The European
Agreement of 1965 is helpful in that the parties pledge cooperation by acting in
their own territories and against their own nationals to shut off support for radio
stations targeted against other states but supported from within their own bounda-
ries. This assists a target state in cases in which the only support for the station
the resumed tenth session of the conference in August 1981 and incorporated into the Draft Convention.
See U.N. CHRONICLE, Sept. 1981, at 21.
209. See U.K. statement, supra note 201.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
211. Under the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 155, the territorial sea is extended
to 12 miles (art. 3), the contiguous zone to 24 (art. 33), the continental shelf to 200 or 350 miles or beyond
(art. 76), and large areas formerly high seas would become archipelagic waters of certain island states (arts.
46-54). Every coastal state would be entitled to an exclusive economic zone extending as far as 200 miles
(art. 57).
212. See Comment, Controlling "Riate" Broadcasting, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 547, 568-69 (1978).
213. See supra text accompanying note 211.
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generated in that state is advertising revenue, and where the sources of that rev-
enue may be difficult to identify because of the complexities of corporate structure.
On the other hand, the adoption of article 109 of the Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea is an exercise in overkill. To grant to any state in which a broad-
cast can be received the authority to board a ship or installation and to arrest and
prosecute the persons or ships involved is a drastic departure from the traditional
freedoms of the high seas and the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of flag
states over ships flying their flags. If there were no other means to deal with the
problem, and if the interest sought to be protected were more vital, perhaps such a
radical departure from the traditional regime would be warranted. But in light of
the effectiveness of the actions which states have been able to take and the current
dormancy of the problem, the draft treaty provision hardly seems warranted. It is
surprising that its inclusion did not provoke opposition at the conference. It repre-
sents another example of the strong tendencies evident at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to discard traditional freedoms of the
seas in favor of restrictive and territorial regimes.

